The term “deep state” is increasingly used today in political discourse, transitioning from journalism into common political language.
However, the term itself is becoming somewhat vague, with different interpretations emerging. It is, therefore, essential to take a closer look at the phenomenon described as the “deep state” and understand when and where this concept first entered into use.
This phrase first appeared in Turkish politics in the 1990s, describing a very specific situation in Turkey. In Turkish, “deep state” is derin devlet. This is crucial because all subsequent uses of this concept are in some way connected to the original meaning, which first emerged in Turkey.
Since the era of Kemal Atatürk, Turkey developed a particular political-ideological movement known as Kemalism. At its core is the cult of Atatürk (literally, “Father of the Turks”), strict secularism (rejecting the religious factor not only in politics but also in public life), nationalism (emphasizing sovereignty and the unity of all citizens in the ethnically diverse political landscape of Turkey), modernism, Europeanism, and progressivism.
Kemalism represented, in many ways, a direct antithesis to the worldview and culture that had dominated in the religious and traditionalist Ottoman Empire. From the creation of Turkey, Kemalism was and largely remains the dominant code of contemporary Turkish politics. It was based on these ideas that the Turkish state was established on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire.
Kemalism openly dominated during Atatürk’s rule, and afterward, this legacy was passed on to his political successors. Kemalism’s ideology included European-style party democracy, but real power was concentrated in the hands of the country’s military leadership, especially in the National Security Council (NSC). After Atatürk’s death, the military elite became the guardian of Kemalism’s ideological orthodoxy.
The Turkish NSC was established in 1960 after a military coup, and its role significantly grew following another coup in 1980.
It is important to note that many senior Turkish military officers and intelligence officials were members of Masonic lodges, intertwining Kemalism with military Freemasonry. Whenever Turkish democracy deviated from Kemalism — whether to the right or left — the military annulled election results and initiated repressions.
However, the term derin devlet emerged only in the 1990s, precisely when political Islamism was growing in Turkey. Here, for the first time in Turkish history, a clash occurred between the deep state’s ideology and political democracy.
The problem arose when Islamists, like Necmettin Erbakan and his follower Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, pursued an alternative political ideology that directly challenged Kemalism. This shift involved everything: Islam replacing secularism, greater ties with the East over the West, and Muslim solidarity instead of Turkish nationalism.
Overall, Salafism and Neo-Ottomanism supplanted Kemalism. Anti-Masonic rhetoric, particularly from Erbakan, replaced the influence of secular military Masonic circles with traditional Sufi orders and moderate Islamic organizations, such as the Nur movement of Fethullah Gülen.
At this point, the idea of the deep state (derin devlet) arose as a descriptive image of the military-political Kemalist core in Turkey, which saw itself as standing above political democracy, canceling elections, arresting political and religious figures, and positioning itself above legal procedures of European-style politics. Electoral democracy functioned only when it aligned with the Kemalist military’s course.
When a critical distance emerged, as with the Islamists, the party that won the elections and even led the government could be disbanded without explanation. In such cases, the “suspension of democracy” had no constitutional basis — the unelected military acted based on “revolutionary expediency” to save Kemalist Turkey.
Later, Erdoğan began a full-scale war against Turkey’s deep state, culminating in the Ergenekon trial in 2007, where nearly the entire military leadership of Turkey was arrested under the pretext of preparing a coup. However, later, Erdoğan fell out with his former ally, Fethullah Gülen, who was deeply entrenched in Western intelligence networks.
Erdoğan restored the status of many deep state members, forming a pragmatic alliance with them, primarily on the common ground of Turkish nationalism. The debate over secularism was softened and postponed, and especially after the failed coup attempt by Gülenists in 2016, Erdoğan himself began to be referred to as a “green Kemalist.”
Despite this, the deep state’s position in Turkey weakened during the confrontation with Erdoğan, and the ideology of Kemalism became diluted, although it survived.
Main features of the Deep State
From the modern political history of Turkey, we can draw several general conclusions. A deep state can exist and makes sense where:
There is a democratic electoral system;
Above this system, there exists an unelected military-political entity bound by a specific ideology (independent of the victory of any particular party);
There is a secret society (such as of the Masonic type) uniting the military-political elite.
The deep state reveals itself when contradictions emerge between formal democratic norms and the power of this elite (otherwise, the existence of the deep state remains obscure). The deep state is possible only in liberal democracies, even nominal ones.
In overtly totalitarian political systems, such as fascism or communism, there is no need for a deep state. Here, a rigidly ideological group openly acknowledges itself as the highest authority, placing itself above formal laws.
Single-party systems emphasize this model of governance, leaving no room for ideological and political opposition. Only in democratic societies, where supposedly no ruling ideology should exist, does the deep state emerge as a phenomenon of “hidden totalitarianism,” which manipulates democracy and multi-party systems at will.
Communists and fascists openly acknowledge the necessity of a ruling ideology, making their political and ideological power direct and transparent (potestas directa, as Carl Schmitt put it).
Liberals deny having an ideology, but they do have one. Therefore, they influence political processes based on liberalism as a doctrine, but only indirectly, through manipulation (potestas indirecta). Liberalism reveals its openly totalitarian and ideological nature only when contradictions arise between it and democratic political processes.
In Turkey, where liberal democracy was borrowed from the West and did not quite align with the political and social psychology of society, the deep state was easily identified and named.
In other democratic systems, the existence of this totalitarian-ideological instance, illegitimate and formally “nonexistent,” became apparent later. However, the Turkish example holds significant importance for understanding this phenomenon. Here, everything is crystal-clear — like an open book.
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